47 United States v. JGC Corp., No. 11-cr-260 (S.D. Tex. April 6, 2011), available at www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/jgc-corp/04-6-11jgc-corp-info.pdf. 33 Dep`t of Justice and Sec. Comm`n, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, at 34 (November 14, 2012) (“Individuals and businesses, including foreign nationals and businesses, may also be held liable for conspiracy to violate the FCPA – that is, approval of a violation of the FCPA – even if they are not or could not be charged regardless of a substantial violation of the FCPA. For example, a foreign and non-edifice company could be convicted of conspiring with a domestic company to violate the FCPA. In certain circumstances, it could also be held liable for the major violations of the FCPA committed by the national group in connection with Pinkerton v.
United States, which will shift the accused to liability for reasonably foreseeable crimes committed by a co-conspirator for the promotion of a conspiracy to which the accused has adhered. . . . If z.B. a foreign company or an individual conspired to violate the FCPA with someone who commits an unreported act within the United States, the United States may sue the foreign company or an individual for conspiracy.” available on www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf. “Over the past decade, the United States has seen the emergence of a new approach to corporate regulation and the continuation of reprehensible behaviour. The U.S. Department of Justice now regularly enters into “non-prosecution” (DPAs or NPAs) agreements with large companies where companies pay billions of dollars in fines each year without trial. These agreements are presented as measures that are not in pursuit of business, a step that could lead companies to bankruptcy and disrupt their economic sectors.
At the same time, a good argument can be made that these agreements suffer from a lack of transparency. Of course, the question arises as to whether lawyers working for the federal government are in the best position to significantly change the business practices of certain companies and even entire sectors, with minimal or no control. The DPAs and NPAs are remarkable in that they impose conditions on companies that go beyond fines or prison sentences normally with criminal penalties and because they go beyond the requirement that companies correct specific practices that would be violations of the law. Instead, these agreements often require major changes in the internal processes of many types of companies – from human resources training – on the obvious assumption that without these changes, faults are likely to recur. 5 See e.B. United States v. Bridgestone Corp., 11-cr-651 (S.D. Tex.
September 15, 2011), available from www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/bridgestone/10-05-11bridgestone-plea.pdf; United States v. Innospec Inc., No. 10-cr-061 (D.D.C. Mur. 17, 2010); United States v. Control Components, Inc., no. 09-cr-00162 (C.D. Cal. 22.07.2009), available from www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/control-inc/07-24-09cci-plea-agree.pdf; United States v. Kellogg Brown – Root LLC, No. 09-cr-071 (S.D. Tex.
February 6, 2009), available from www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kelloggb/02-11-09kbr-plea-agree.pdf.